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INTRODUCTION 
Dewey & LeBoeuf’s bankruptcy filing on May 28, 2012 
shocked the legal community.  The latest in an alarming series 
of bankruptcies, the implosion of one of the profession’s most 
influential and respected names was “the largest law firm 
collapse in United States history.”1  The event carried an 
ominous immediacy.  The fall of a titan cast doubt on the 
vitality of every law firm—” ‘ if Dewey could go down, could 
we?’ ” 2  The bankruptcy filing was read as a “strong warning 
for lawyers everywhere: Change or die.”3  This warning seems 
severe, but carries with it a hard truth.  Dewey & LeBoeuf had 
its own singular set of circumstances that pushed it into the 
abyss, but the broad structural characteristics that 
 
 1. Peter Lattman, Dewey & LeBoeuf Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (May 
28, 2012, 10:21 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/dewey-leboeuf-files-
for-bankruptcy/. 
 2. Joseph Ax & Sakthi Prasad, Dewey files for Chapter 11 in record law firm 
collapse, REUTERS (May 29, 2012, 7:23 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/05/29/us-deweyandlebouef-bankruptcy-idUSBRE84S01R20120529 
(quoting legal consultant Kent Zimmerman). 
 3. Daniel Fisher, Dewey and LeBoeuf Bankruptcy Tells Lawyers: Change or 
Die, FORBES (May 29, 2012, 2:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher
/2012/05/29/dewey-and-leboeuf-bankruptcy-tells-lawyers-change-or-die/. 
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precipitated Dewey’s failure were not unique to the now-
defunct firm.  Over two years out, however, it appears that the 
existential portent has been largely ignored. 
A combination of factors caused Dewey’s collapse, 
including: (1) overcompensation and guaranteed pay for 
rainmakers; (2) increased firm-wide compensation; (3) 
excessive bonuses paid as a result of the merger between 
Dewey Ballantine and Leboeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae; (4) 
agreements to pay off $60 million of Dewey Ballantine’s pre-
merger debts; (5) uncontrolled national and international 
expansion with leverage; and (6) the economic downturn 
following the 2008 financial crisis.4 
Complex law firm bankruptcies, once quite rare, are now 
commonplace.5  The series of events leading to an individual 
filing Chapter 7 or 13 consumer bankruptcy may be tragic; 
however, such bankruptcies typically create few far-reaching 
negative externalities and ideally allow the debtor to emerge 
from the discharge with the ability to make a fresh financial 
start.  When law firms—especially large ones—file 
bankruptcy, it almost always signals the end of the firm.  
Naturally, management partners do not want their firm to 
fold—they face the prospect of having their equity wiped out.  
However, bankruptcy is a worrisome prospect not only for 
those in the inside and at the top of a law firm.  When a firm 
implodes, the fallout can be immense.  Offices may be 
shuttered in multiple states and countries, lawyers and 
support staff are put out of work, the firm’s creditors face the 
prospect of getting cents (or nothing) on the dollar, active 
matters stall indefinitely, and clients are left in the lurch—to 
name only a few of the more obvious impacts.  There is not a 
net social or private benefit to be gained from a firm 
bankruptcy.  Although the aggregate financial cost of a large 
firm collapse may exceed that connected to the bankruptcy 
filing of a smaller firm, the reality is that the risk of 
bankruptcy touches all firms—large or small, full service or 
boutique, and everything in between.  The fallout from the 
collapse of a firm is broadly the same in types and form across 
 
 4. Julie Triedman et al., House of Cards, AM. LAWYER, July/Aug. 2012, at 
56. 
 5. Jonathan D. Glater, Big Law Firm May Vote to Dissolve, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/27/business/27law.html (Ward 
Bower, principal at law firm consulting group Altman Weil, noted that “ ‘ the 
business failure of firms has been becoming more common.’ ” ). 
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firm specializations and sizes—people still lose their 
livelihood, clients can still be caught flatfooted.  Given the 
massive costs a law firm bankruptcy imposes on a wide array 
of stakeholders, the fact they are occurring with mounting 
frequency is a matter of grave concern and one that calls for 
closer examination. 
This Article explores selected major historical law firm 
bankruptcies as a means of identifying common elements.  
These similarities indicate that certain broad circumstances 
and institutional structural deficiencies—including economic 
turmoil, excessive growth and overcompensation, and toxic 
firm culture and governance—can act as factors precipitating 
or hastening the financial collapse of firms.  This Article goes 
on to explore a variety solutions designed to address these 
conditions and weaknesses and thereby mitigate the risk of 
law firm bankruptcies.  Specifically, this Article recommends 
(a) a market-based solution allowing the public to invest in law 
firms—thereby increasing the ability of firms to access capital, 
creating more financial stability, and triggering public 
oversight of firm finances; (b) the adoption of a regulatory 
system whereby all of a firm’s finance, oversight, governance, 
and risk management practices would be disclosed to all firm 
partners (in both single-tier and two-tier firms) on a specified 
basis; (c) contractual restrictions governing the departure of 
rainmaker partners; (d) the legislative enactment of the 
unfinished business doctrine; and (e) regulatory oversight of 
law firms by a governmental agency.  Explored—but 
ultimately dismissed—as potential solutions are: (a) changes 
to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility; and (b) 
expansion into new international legal markets.  This Article 
endeavors to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of 
these solutions designed to mitigate the risk of law firm 
bankruptcy. 
I. HISTORY OF LAW FIRM BANKRUPTCIES 
The five largest law firm bankruptcies of the last thirty 
years involved prestigious firms, all of which employed more 
than six hundred attorneys.  The downfall of Finley Kumble 
Wagner Heine Underberg Manley Myerson & Casey (“Finley 
Kumble”), Coudert Brothers (“Coudert”), Thelen Brown 
Raysman & Steiner (“Thelen”), Heller Ehrman White & 
McAuliffe (“Heller Ehrman”), and Dewey LeBoeuf (“Dewey”) 
were not anomalies.  This Part will examine the collapses of 
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these five firms in chronological order, devoting the largest 
amount of attention to Dewey & LeBoeuf—the most recent and 
most spectacular of the bankruptcies.  Each institution’s path 
from esteemed, functioning law firm to bankruptcy will be 
explored in order to demonstrate the shared problems that 
ultimately resulted in their collapse. 
A. Finley Kumble 
Finley Kumble departed from the traditional law firm 
model based on seniority and pioneered a model focused 
entirely on productivity.6  In doing so, Finley Kumble became 
a true meritocracy that adopted a commission-for-fees 
operation.7  Despite the firm’s rise to prominence and novel 
arrangement, it experienced a downfall that has left a lasting 
impression on the legal field. 
Founded in New York in 1968 as Finley Kumble 
Underberg Persky & Roth,8 the firm rapidly grew into a legal 
powerhouse with over seven hundred attorneys.  By the late 
1980s, the firm—then operating under the name Finley, 
Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson, & 
Casey—would become the nation’s fourth-largest.9  Its 
architect and leader, Steven J. Kumble, masterminded the 
transformation.10  Kumble envisioned his progeny becoming 
bigger and wealthier than any other firm by adopting a more 
aggressive, merit-oriented, and business-savvy culture.11  Most 
of the attorneys who joined Finley Kumble were drawn by the 
firm’s unique pay scale.12  Compensation and bonuses 
correlated directly with billed hours, collected revenue, and 
 
 6. Steven Brill, 1987: Bye, Bye, Finley, Kumble, AM. LAWYER, Sept. 1994, at 
1. 
 7. Steven J. Harper, Who Remembers Finley Kumble?, BELLY OF THE BEAST 
(Oct. 14, 2010), http://thelawyerbubble.com/2010/10/14/who-remembers-finley-
kumble/. 
 8. John Nielsen & Patricia A. Langan, An Upstart Law Firm Comes of Age, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 29, 1986), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/
fortune_archive/1986/09/29/68093/. 
 9. Anne Michaud, Law Firm Collapse Bankrupts Attorney in a Billion-
Dollar Way, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 3, 1990), http://articles.latimes.com/1990-10-
03/business/fi-1720_1_law-firm; Suzi Ring, Finley Kumble’s Children—The 
Familiar Cycle of Legal Collapses, LEGALWEEK (June 22, 2012), 
http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/analysis/2186471/finley-kumble-s-
children-familiar-cycle-legal-collapses. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Brill, supra note 6, at 7. 
 12. Id. 
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new client or business retention.13 
Marshall Manley, a brash New Yorker, joined the firm in 
1978 and built Finley Kumble’s California outpost to over one 
hundred fifty attorneys.14  By 1979, Finley Kumble’s New York 
office, managed by Steven Kumble, grew to seventy lawyers.15  
By 1984, under the guidance of Robert Washington, Jr., the 
Washington D.C. office had flourished—attracting over eighty 
attorneys.16  Other locations, such as Florida, also experienced 
rapid growth.17  The firm appealed to midsize businesses eager 
to grow and willing to employ an equally ambitious law firm.18  
This rapport worked well for gaining clients and growing 
business.19 
Despite such successful growth, Finley Kumble had 
significant flaws in their corporate structure.  In particular, 
the firm’s culture revolved around money and greed.20  With 
sound judgment clouded by avarice, Finley Kumble found itself 
facing problems largely of its own creation, namely: (1) 
financial statements whose usefulness was clouded by 
misleading accounting practices; (2) declining revenue; (3) 
excessive debt; and (4) managerial tensions.21 
First, Finley Kumble’s financial statements did not reflect 
its true revenue earnings.22  To bolster revenue, Finley Kumble 
“sold” account receivables to a dummy corporation that 
purchased the receivables with a loan guaranteed by the 
 
 13. Finley’s iconoclastic philosophies left an immediate and lasting impact on 
the legal profession.  “During its relatively short lifespan, Finley Kumble changed 
almost all the unspoken rules of the profession.  In doing so, it reaped massive 
financial awards and became—simultaneously—the most reviled and envied law 
firm of its day. . . . [T]he Finley Kumble way is instantly recognizable (even if 
unspoken) in the strategic plan of every large firm today . . . .”  DAVID JARGIELLO 
& PHYLLIS GARDNER, FREE AGENT DYSFUNCTION: MANAGEMENT REALPOLITIK 
FOR U.S. LAW FIRMS, JARGIELLO LAW (Aug. 16, 2010), 
http://www.jargiellolaw.com/site/1850jarg/White_Paper_Series_-
_Free_Agent_Dysfunction_-_Print_v3.2_-_COPY.pdf. 
 14. Brill, supra note 6, at 7; Jim Talley, Finley Kumble Law Firm Opens Office 
In Broward, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale) (Feb. 15, 1986), http://articles.sun-
sentinel.com/1986-02-15/business/8601100450_1_finley-kumble-esm-
government-securities-law-firm. 
 15. Brill, supra note 6, at 7. 
 16. Id. at 8. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Nielsen & Langan, supra note 8. 
 21. See Brill, supra note 6. 
 22. Id. at 3. 
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firm.23  The tactic permitted the firm to borrow money to pay 
excessive firm debt while at the same time characterizing the 
money as cash received as opposed to money borrowed.24  
Furthermore, the scheme misleadingly inflated partnership 
profits, revenue per lawyer, and firm revenue.25  Reliance on 
this method became increasingly detrimental over the years 
prior to the firm’s demise.26 
Second, revenues declined significantly while Finley 
Kumble was using these tactics.27  Rainmakers encountered 
problems with fee collection and meeting projecting revenue 
streams, thereby failing to justify their exorbitant pay with 
concomitant cash inflows.28  Runaway growth contributed to 
declining per-lawyer revenue as rainmakers clamored for 
mounting compensation and as the firm sought expensive, big-
name lateral hires that contributed little in bringing new 
business to the firm in the short-term.29  Furthermore, 
expenses drastically increased as Finley Kumble spent 
extravagantly on remodeled offices, beautiful art collections, 
pseudo-rainmakers, rent, promotion, insurance, and salaries.30 
Third, the firm incurred $76 million in debt as a result of 
their accounting practices, recruiting tactics, and lavish 
spending.31  By July 31, 1987, the firm had $53.8 million in 
outstanding loans—a large portion of which related to the loan 
guarantees made in exchange for selling accounts 
receivables.32  The remainder of the firm’s debt was contingent 
liabilities in the form of loans guaranteeing partners’ capital 
contributions.33 
 
 23. Id. at 4. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 3. 
 26. Id. at 4.  In 1985, $1.8 million in accounts receivables were “sold” to a 
dummy corporation.  In 1986, $10 million was “sold.”  Finally, in 1987, $27 million 
was sold.  Id. The temptations and dangers of using self-owned entities as factors 
would later prove to be an important part of Enron’s undoing.  See, e.g., 1 JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, REP. OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORP. AND RELATED 
ENTITIES REGARDING FED. TAX AND COMP. ISSUES, AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS, 85 (2003). 
 27. Brill, supra note 6, at 3. 
 28. Nielsen & Langan, supra note 8. 
 29. Brill, supra note 6, at 8; Steven J. Harper, Are You Worth $5 Million?, 
BELLY OF THE BEAST (Feb. 10, 2011), http://thelawyerbubble.com/2011/02/10
/are-you-worth-5-million/. 
 30. Brill, supra note 6, at 3. 
 31. Id. at 6. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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The operation of this grand and complex business 
enterprise resulted in the clashing of several named partners.34  
Marshall Manley, the managing partner of Finley Kumble’s 
California office, entered into a power struggle with Steven 
Kumble.35  Later, Harvey Myerson, another named partner 
and significant rainmaker, joined the fray.36  These disputes 
led to the firm splintering into two separate factions—
supporters of Kumble and the Florida office versus Manley of 
the California office, Myerson of the New York office, and 
Robert Washington of the D.C. office.37  The fighting 
contributed to weakened finances and stood as testament to 
Finley Kumble’s failure to operate as one cohesive, national 
law firm driven first and foremost by the interests of their 
clients.38 
In 1987, the United States’ fourth largest law firm filed 
bankruptcy and dissolved.39  The first truly merit-based law 
firm attempted to raid, recruit, and compensate high-profile 
rainmakers to support the firm’s expansion.  Ultimately, as the 
guaranteed compensation promises crumbled under the 
weight of declining revenues and excessive debt, the firm’s 
predatory and money-driven culture left the institution with 
no other values to support its continued existence.40 
B. Coudert Brothers 
Coudert was a New York-based law firm established in 
1853 and recognized as an international firm by 1879.41  At the 
 
 34. Id. at 9. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Brill, supra note 6, at 10. 
 37. Id.  See, e.g., E. R. Shipp, Carey Joins a New Firm As Old One Dissolves, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/12/05/business/carey-
joins-a-new-firm-as-old-one-dissolves.html; Jim Talley, Florida Law Offices May 
Split From Parent, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale) (Nov. 12, 1987), 
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1987-11-12/business/8702040967_1_firm-offices-
law. 
 38. Brill, supra note 6, at 15. See E. R. Shipp, Finley, Kumble, Major Law 
Firm, Facing Revamping or Dissolution, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 1987), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/11/business/finley-kumble-major-law-firm-
facing-revamping-or-dissolution.html, for a contemporary account of the firm’s 
impending collapse that touches on the internal strains operating on the firm. 
 39. Steven J. Harper, The Ghost of Finley Kumble, AM LAW DAILY (Oct. 15, 
2010, 11:30 AM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/10/harper
mergers.html. 
 40. Brill, supra note 6, at 15. 
 41. Darrel Wright, The Rise and Fall of Coudert Brothers, ASIALAW PROFILES 
(Dec. 1, 2005), http://www.asialawprofiles.com/Article/1971491/The-Rise-and-
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firm’s peak it had twenty-eight offices in eighteen countries, 
employed more than eight hundred attorneys, and was one of 
the largest law firms in the world.42  Despite this widespread 
influence, Coudert collapsed after more than a century and a 
half of operations.  The primary reasons for its failure include: 
(1) overreliance on its international practice; (2) excessive 
financial obligations to partners; (3) abortive merger attempts; 
and (4) failure to overcome a culture in which clients were 
viewed more as “property” of individual partners rather than 
as clients of the firm itself. 
For many years, Coudert relied heavily on its 
international practice.43  While an international practice is a 
source of prestige—and of potential profits—it is also a source 
of potential risk.  Operating across different economic 
environments often entails smaller profit margins, and 
resultantly smaller margins for error.44  If a firm stretches 
itself too thin internationally, its maneuverability in the face 
of financial pressures can be greatly reduced.  Such was the 
case with Coudert.  As the firm expanded, it found itself unable 
to obtain adequate capital through operations and equity 
financing and instead borrowed money in order to bring in 
additional practice groups.45  Ultimately, the combination of 
internationalization of operations and heavy borrowing 
reduced Coudert’s financial agility and impugned its ability to 
compete with its peers on an even footing.46 
Further weakening the structure of the firm, Coudert 
overpaid its partners.47  Although overpayments are not 
uncommon before law firms reconcile partnership payments 
with actual profits, Coudert had serious financial concerns at 
the time the overpayments to partners were made.48  Contrary 
to expectations, revenue streams sufficient to correct the 
effects of this over-distribution failed to materialize.49  At the 
time of bankruptcy, Coudert owed over $8 million in partner 
 
Fall-of-Coudert-Brothers.html. 
 42. Douglas R. Richmond, Migratory Law Partners and the Glue of 
Unfinished Business, 39 N. KY. L. REV. 359, 360 (2012); Wright, supra note 41. 
 43. Ellen Rosen, The Complicated End of an Ex-Law Firm, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
9, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/09/business/09legal.html. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Rosen, supra note 43. 
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compensation.50 
Moreover, overpayments to partners in combination with 
lateral moves of equity partners forced the firm below the 
required number of equity partners under its loan provisions 
with Citibank, N.A. and JPMorgan Chase Bank.51  This exodus 
ultimately spelled the downfall of Coudert.  In a final attempt 
to salvage the enterprise, Coudert attempted to merge with 
other firms.  After merger talks with Squire, Sanders & 
Dempsey in 2004 and Baker & McKenzie in early-to mid-2005 
failed, Coudert found itself with its back to the wall.52  
Subsequently, the banks refused to extend further credit to 
Coudert, called in their loans, and forced the firm to dissolve 
in August 2005.53 
Coudert filed for bankruptcy on September 22, 2006.54  
Bankruptcy Judge McMahon made several observations about 
Coudert’s downfall.55  He noted that the mega-firm model 
resulted in divisions among classes of partners, client 
hoarding, and mercenary lateral hiring.56  He further stated 
that many partners no longer saw their book of business as an 
asset of the firm, but as their personal property.57  Thus, in 
Judge McMahon’s view, Coudert’s culture and management 
style undermined the idea that client matters are firm 
property and greatly diminished the institutional cohesiveness 
necessary to respond to crises.58  Coudert’s dissolution marked 
one of the most historic and significant failures of an 
international law firm. 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Ross Todd, Rescues Gone Wrong?, AM. LAWYER (Feb. 1, 2011), 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202479106564/Rescues-Gone-Wrong. 
 52. Wright, supra note 41. 
 53. Todd, supra note 51. 
 54.  Patrick Fitzgerald, Coudert Brothers Law Firm Files for Chapter 11 
Protection, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2006, 2:49 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
articles/SB115895051966871505. 
 55. Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 477 B.R. 
318, 329–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), amended, superseded, 480 B.R. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), 
rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. In re Coudert Bros. LLP, 574 F. App’x 15 
(2d Cir. 2014). 
 56. Id. at 330; see also Paul R. Hage & Patrick R. Mohan, You Can’t Take 
Them With You, Coudert Brothers and the Application of the Unfinished-Business 
Rule to Dissolved Law Firms, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 2012, at 14, 15–72. 
 57. Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 330; see also Mark Harris, Why More Law 
Firms Will Go the Way of Dewey & LeBoeuf, FORBES (May 8, 2012, 10:32 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2012/05/08/why-more-law-
firms-will-go-the-way-of-dewey-leboeuf/. 
 58. Dev. Specialists, 477 B.R. at 330–31. 
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C. Thelen 
San Francisco-based law firm Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & 
Bridges was founded in 1924.59  In June 1998, the firm merged 
with New York-based Reid and Priest to form Thelen & Priest 
LLP.60  In a bid to further increase the firm’s East Coast 
presence, Thelen & Priest LLP merged with the New York firm 
of Brown Raysman Millstein Felder & Steiner, LLP (“Brown 
Raysman”) in 2006.61 
Thelen Brown Raysman & Steiner LLP, a bicoastal firm of 
over six hundred attorneys, materialized from the merger.62  
Optimism surrounding the prospects of the new firm would 
prove premature.  Thelen ultimately succumbed to a mix of 
factors broadly similar to those that proved the undoing of the 
other firms discussed in this Part: (1) economic recession; (2) 
defection of partners; (3) failed merger efforts; and (4) 
incautious financing practices. 
A downturn in business left Thelen increasingly 
vulnerable to the effects of voluntary departures and lateral 
hiring of partners.63  Thelen lost around two hundred and 
thirty attorneys between the 2006 merger and the autumn of 
2008, including three named partners from the pre-merger 
Brown Raysman.64  The firm attempted to stem this attrition 
through another merger, but discussions with Nixon Peabody 
 
 59. Andrew S. Ross, Confirmed: Thelen Falls, SFGATE (Oct. 28, 2008, 2:41 
PM), http://blog.sfgate.com/bottomline/2008/10/28/confirmed-thelen-falls/. 
 60. Melody Petersen, Bicoastal Deal May Herald Wave of Law Firm Mergers, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/06/business
/bicoastal-deal-may-herald-wave-of-law-firm-mergers.html. 
 61. Debra Cassens Weiss, Thelen Chair Blames Failed Merger on 
‘Juxtaposition of Circumstances’, ABA J. (Nov. 13, 2008, 3:17 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/thelen_chair_blames_failed_merger_on
_juxtaposition_of_circumstances/; see also Leigh Jones, Defections continue at 
Thelen, NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 8, 2008), http://www.nationallawjournal.com
/id=1202424036456/Defections-continue-at-Thelen-?slreturn=20141024201802. 
 62. David McAfee, Thelen Trustee Says Clawback Claims Must Be Arbitrated, 
LAW360 (Sept. 25, 2014, 4:11 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/581077
/thelen-trustee-says-clawback-claims-must-be-arbitrated; Dan Slater, Thelen 
Fires 26 Associates as Firm Layoffs Spread West, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2008), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/03/20/thelen-fires-26-associates-as-firm-layoffs-
spread-west/. 
 63. Eric Young, Defections raise questions at Thelen, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Oct. 27, 
2008, 2:54 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/2008
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LLP and other firms proved unsuccessful.65  After these deals 
fell through, Thelen—at that point under the threat of 
dissolution—attempted to divest itself of certain practice 
groups.66  Thelen subsequently shortened its name in August 
2008 to Thelen LLP (“Thelen”).67 
In early September 2009, Thelen was finally pushed into 
the abyss of bankruptcy.  Citigroup, Inc., Thelen’s primary 
secured creditor, refused to extend additional funds to cover 
the cost of collection, winding down of operations, or legal 
expenses associated with Chapter 11 proceedings.68  On 
October 28, 2008, Thelen’s partnership council launched a 
dissolution vote.69  The vote carried, mere weeks after fellow 
San Francisco firm Heller Ehrman folded.70 
According to Thelen, the firm’s estimated realizable assets 
were insufficient to result in any “meaningful payment to 
unsecured creditors” in light of the amount owned to Citibank 
on its secured loan.71  The estimated remaining assets were 
accounts receivable of approximately $35 million.72  However, 
after considering the liabilities, which amounted to over $18 
million, Thelen estimated that it had only $10 million in 
realizable assets.73 
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Interestingly, Thelen was the fourth most highly 
leveraged American law firm before its demise.74  After the 
dissolution, critics claimed that Brown Raysman carried too 
much debt and specialized in practice areas that did not match 
well with Thelen’s premier construction group.75  Thelen’s 
chairman, Stephen O’Neal, attributed the collapse of Thelen to 
an “economic juxtaposition of circumstances.”76  Ultimately, 
Thelen filed a petition to liquidate under Chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code on September 18, 2009. 
D. Heller Ehrman 
Founded in 1890 by Emanuel S. Heller, what started as a 
solo practice in San Francisco’s Financial District rapidly 
expanded, adopting its permanent name of Heller, Ehrman, 
White, & McAuliffe in 1921.77  Heller Ehrman played a 
significant role in the expansion of the western United States, 
helping establish Wells Fargo Bank and arranging financing 
for the Golden Gate Bridge.78  Growing at one point to 
approximately seven hundred attorneys, the firm was a 
pioneer in providing legal services in business, technology, and 
complex litigation cases.79 
On September 26, 2008, in a shocking turn of events, 
Heller Ehrman voted to dissolve, ending a legal enterprise that 
survived the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, the Great 
Depression, and World Wars I and II.80  The consensus on the 
primary causes of Heller Ehrman’s dissolution implicates: (1) 
an unusual firm structure insufficiently resilient in the face of 
financial instability; (2) failure to globalize or specialize the 
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firm; (3) susceptibility to lawyer raiding; and (4) unsuccessful 
merger efforts.81 
First, Heller Ehrman adopted a peculiar business 
structure different from the vast majority of law firms.82  
Instead of the typical limited liability partnership model, 
widely used by large firms today, Heller Ehrman was a 
partnership made up of professional corporations.83  In order 
to avoid double taxation of its income, the firm distributed all 
of its earnings at the end of each fiscal year and used a line of 
credit to fund operations until the subsequent year’s revenues 
caught up with its previous year’s expenses.84  Former Heller 
Ehrman partner Stephen Ferrulo speculated that this unique 
method of firm operation was particularly vulnerable to 
market downturns, and that a decline in business in 2007 
“combined with the tight financial climate [to make 2008’s] 
financial juggle even tougher . . . .”85 
Second, although the firm prospered as the economy of the 
western United States surged, San Francisco—the center of 
the former boom—later underwent a drastic economic 
change.86  In particular, the city’s shrinking industrialized 
base of small to midsized businesses were too few to support 
the growing number of firms competing for that same 
business.87  Heller Ehrman’s failure to globalize or further 
specialize in additional fields also decreased their ability to 
maintain revenues.88  More than sixty percent of its business 
was from its litigation practice group, and a quarter of its 
litigation practice disappeared because of a changing San 
Francisco clientele.89  By the time Heller Ehrman attempted to 
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expand globally, it was too far behind other firms.90  Heller 
neglected to shore up its core competency while simultaneously 
failing to adapt to the new paradigm. 
Third, similar to many other large law firms, wavering 
partner loyalty emerged as a significant problem.  Like a 
cheetah singling out a sick gazelle, headhunters and competing 
law firms saw an opportunity in Heller Ehrman’s structural 
and expansion problems to poach the firm’s rainmakers.91  The 
departure of one partner eventually led to a snowballing 
exodus of other partners.92  On September 14, 2008, a large 
group of Heller Ehrman’s intellectual property lawyers left to 
another law firm.93  Without its strongest partners and 
rainmakers at the helm, Heller became a sinking ship. 
Finally, in a last effort to save the firm, Heller Ehrman 
searched for another firm to absorb its attorneys through a 
merger.94  This effort proved fruitless as every merger 
candidate passed on the opportunity to join the one hundred 
eighteen year-old firm.  One week following the departure of 
Heller Ehrman’s intellectual property group, the firm’s banks 
froze its accounts.95  Several days later, the firm voted to 
dissolve one of the most historic and long-standing legal 
establishments in the United States.96 
E. Dewey & LeBoeuf 
February 13, 2012 was the beginning of the end for Dewey.  
During a meeting called by Chairman Steven Davis, it became 
obvious Dewey had serious financial issues.97  Davis informed 
two dozen of the highest compensated rainmaker partners that 
Dewey “could not cover the roughly $250 million it owed 
partners in guaranteed compensation.”98  Within three months 
of the merger between LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae 
(“LeBoeuf Lamb”) and Dewey Ballantine, the firm—once 
thirteen hundred lawyers strong—became the largest United 
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States law firm in history to file Chapter 11 bankruptcy.99  The 
events leading up to Dewey’s collapse illustrate the problems 
that can make even large and prominent law firms prone to 
bankruptcy. 
1. The Rise and Fall of Dewey 
Dewey Ballantine and LeBoeuf Lamb merged in 2007 to 
form Dewey & LeBoeuf—the world’s twenty-third largest law 
firm by revenue at the time.100  The merger represented the 
culmination of several events and trends.101  Davis, as the sole 
chairman of LeBoeuf Lamb, employed a strategy of hiring 
rainmaker partners from other firms.102  This hiring strategy 
proved successful for several years.103  LeBoeuf Lamb doubled 
its profits per partner between 2000 and 2006 “from $705,000 
to $1,450,000.”104  Even in light of the firm’s expansion to 713 
lawyers by 2007, Davis hoped to further expand through a 
merger with another firm.105 
Dewey Ballantine, on the other hand, wanted to stabilize 
its firm following failed merger negotiations with Orrick, 
Herrington & Sutcliffe in January 2007.106  The collapse of 
these merger negotiations devastated Dewey Ballantine and 
caused a fifth of the partnership, including key mergers and 
acquisitions partners, to leave the firm.107  Consequently, 
Dewey Ballantine sought to diversify its business to prevent 
overreliance on its M&A practice group108 
Over the next few months, Dewey Ballantine and LeBoeuf 
Lamb engaged in secret merger discussions that resulted in an 
agreement in August 2007.109  Following the agreement, Paul, 
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison conducted due diligence 
on Dewey Ballantine, McKinsey & Company, Inc., analyzed 
the benefits of the merger, and Ernst & Young LLP reviewed 
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Dewey’s financial information on behalf of LeBoeuf Lamb.110  
However, transparency and caution were in short supply: the 
new Dewey & LeBoeuf partners received merger agreements 
that did not contain financial details about either of their prior 
firms.111  Allegedly, neither Dewey Ballantine nor LeBoeuf 
Lamb had outside counsel regarding its merger.112 
LeBoeuf Lamb partners approved the merger plan, but 
required concessions to obtain the necessary support.113  Davis 
and LeBoeuf Lamb executive director Stephen DiCarmine 
promised large bonuses for longtime LeBoeuf Lamb partners, 
executive committee members, and top management 
conditioned on the merger vote’s passage.114  In particular, 
legacy LeBoeuf Lamb executive members would each receive 
approximately $300,000, and top administrators would receive 
approximately $1 million.115  A merger memorandum also 
noted a special $15 million payment to LeBoeuf Lamb legacy 
partners.116  Other key rainmakers were guaranteed large 
bonuses designed to keep them at the firm—one partner, for 
example, was promised “$6 million dollars for several years.”117  
DiCarmine stated in early 2009 that any partner bringing in 
“over $10 million in business got a package, a long-term 
incentive plan.”118 
Signs of trouble quickly surfaced.  In March 2008, Leboeuf 
Lamb legacy partners discovered that they were accountable 
for $60 million in payouts to retired Dewey Ballantine partners 
pursuant to that firm’s partnership agreement.119  
Nonetheless, Davis—with the consent of the compensation and 
executive committees—updated partner compensation 
packages that same month by placing partners in similar tiers 
at both firms into whichever firm’s compensation band was 
higher.120  As a result, partners from both sides saw their 
compensation increase.121 
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Despite increased difficulty meeting a target “profit pool” 
twenty-five percent greater than the combined profits of the 
two predecessor firms’ best-netting years, Dewey nonetheless 
announced compensation increases for its partners on March 
13th.122  The timing could not have been worse.  One day after 
this announcement, Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. collapsed.123  
Lehman Brothers Inc. failed six months later, and American 
International Group, Inc. failed soon thereafter.124  “The 
bottom had fallen out of the capital and credit markets that 
sustained both the Dewey-side corporate practice and the 
Leboeuf-side insurance practice.”125 
This resulted in Dewey offices closing in Austin, Hartford, 
Jacksonville, and Charlotte.126  The profit pool for 2008 totaled 
only $278 million—forty percent of projections.127  Dewey drew 
on about $60 million in revenues from the first quarter of 2009 
to “cover the shortfall” between expected profits and expenses 
of the prior year.128  These 2009 revenues compensated the 
most important rainmaker partners, but other partners saw 
their compensation cut by over forty percent.129 
As the economy continued to decline, many Dewey 
partners did not receive their promised compensation.130  In 
2009, revenues again slipped by 16% to $809 million and 
profits fell 13% to $241 million.”131  However, Davis continued 
his policy of rapid growth by hiring additional rainmakers from 
Cooley LLP.132  Dewey subsequently sold $150 million in term 
notes to refinance firm debt and for general use.133  The firm 
did not alert investors to the firm’s ballooning obligations 
connected with partner compensation.134 
In late 2011, when the legal market began to recover from 
the 2008 lateral hiring freeze, Davis extended new financial 
guarantees to at least one hundred partners to prevent 
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rainmakers from leaving the firm and taking their clients with 
them.135  Davis hid the scope of this practice from the 
compensation committee.136 
Throughout 2011, Dewey expanded into various 
international markets and appeared to accumulate more 
business.137  However, by late December 2011 and early 2012, 
more problems began to emerge: rainmakers failed to collect 
bills (or failed to send them altogether) and clients continued 
to cut back on legal spending.138  Dewey’s partners did not 
know that the firm’s “obligations for current and deferred 
compensation exceeded its earnings by at least $250 
million.”139 
Partners finally learned about Dewey’s dire financial 
outlook on January 27, 2012, during an “all-partner video 
conference.”140  Davis informed the partners that Dewey had 
revenues of roughly $780 million in 2011, which generated 
“only $280 million in profits.”141  Because profits generated by 
the firm had to be used to pay obligations “owed to partners 
from prior years,” Dewey did not issue any 2011 profit 
distributions.142  Dewey maintained that the partners should 
not be worried—according to DiCarmine, “the firm had $250 
million in accounts receivable less than 180 days old . . . as well 
as $400 million in older uncollected bills.”143  Despite these 
words of encouragement, “a trickle of partners began to 
leave.”144 
After the February 13th meeting, a group of senior 
partners (eventually referred to as the operations committee) 
announced that almost all of the highest-paid partners had 
“agreed to compensation caps of $2.5 million in 2012.”145  This 
committee subsequently “proposed a long term plan to repay 
about half the $250 million in deferred compensation owed to 
partners and write off the rest.”146 Pursuant to the plan, “a 
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portion of annual profits” would be allotted “to fund a trust.”147  
After two or three years, “the trust would begin paying down 
deferred compensation over” a period of seven to eight years.148 
This would never reach fruition: on March 17, 2012, 
Dewey’s insurance transaction group moved to Willkie Farr & 
Gallagher.149 Following this departure, additional partners 
began to lateral to other firms.150  Twenty-two partners left in 
March 2012 alone.151  Some of Dewey’s most senior and highest 
paid partners attempted to restructure the firm to stabilize the 
situation, and a five-person “office of the chairman” replaced 
DiCarmine as the firm’s day-to-day manager.152  Management 
knew that the hemorrhage of partners was unsustainable, and 
the office of the chairman had discussions with “about six 
firms, all of which expressed interest in taking parts of Dewey. 
Greenberg Traurig was the most serious.”153  By the time 
Greenberg went public with its interest in “a large-scale deal” 
for acquiring Dewey, thirty-one additional “partners had 
announced their departures” from Dewey.154  Greenberg 
withdrew from its acquisition talks with Dewey after it became 
public that Davis was the target of a criminal probe for his 
conduct as Dewey’s chairman.155 
When Greenberg pulled out of merger talks, the firm’s 
managers told all the remaining partners “that they were free 
to go elsewhere.”156  Consequently, 214 partners left in May 
2012.157 Dewey subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
on May 28, 2012, becoming the largest law firm in American 
history to declare bankruptcy.158 
On February 27, 2013, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Martin 
Glenn approved Dewey’s liquidation plan.159  Pursuant to the 
plan, “former Dewey partners agreed to pay $71.5 million to 
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the firm’s estate in exchange for a release from litigation.  The 
deal required partners to contribute between $5,000 and $3.5 
million each.”160  Overall “[m]ore than 450 Dewey partners 
opted into the settlement, though a handful . . . declined to 
participate.” 
Secured creditors, such as JPMorgan Chase & Co., had a 
total of “$262 million in claims against Dewey.”161  Under the 
second amended bankruptcy plan, general unsecured creditors 
are slated to receive only five to fourteen cents on the dollar for 
their $300 million in claims.162  Totaling the claim classes, the 
ABA Journal reported that Dewey owed creditors 
approximately $562 million.163  Pursuant to the bankruptcy 
plan, “secured creditors get 80 percent of what is distributed 
by the bankruptcy estate, and unsecured creditors get 20 
percent.”164  In the June 30, 2014 distribution under the plan, 
holders of general unsecured claims received very slightly 
more than four cents on the dollar.165 
According to court papers, “[t]wo other former Dewey 
leaders, Chief Financial Officer Joel Sanders and Executive 
Director Stephen DiCarmine, were not included in the 
proposed settlement.  The trustee reserved the right to pursue 
non-covered claims against the two men . . . .”166  In March of 
2014, New York prosecutors filed a 106-count indictment 
against Davis, DiCarmine, and others alleging that firm 
leadership had engaged in a criminal scheme to defraud 
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creditors.167  Between cut positions, shuttered offices, creditor 
losses, and the presentation of thorny issues such as the proper 
disposition of the firm’s old files,168 the fallout of the collapse 
was immense.  As of this writing, the Dewey bankruptcy 
proceedings are ongoing—and are likely to be for some time. 
2. Reasons for Dewey’s Bankruptcy 
Dewey dissolved as a consequence of: (1) 
overcompensation and guaranteed pay for rainmakers; (2) 
excessive bonuses paid as a result of the merger between 
Dewey Ballantine and LeBoeuf Lamb that went unrevealed to 
most partners until the eleventh hour; (3) agreements to pay 
off $60 million of Dewey Ballantine’s pre-merger debts; (4) 
increased firm-wide compensation; (5) uncontrolled, leveraged 
national and international expansion; and (6) the economic 
downturn following the 2008 financial crisis.169 
First, the partners at Dewey backed themselves into a 
corner through the implementation of grandiose compensation 
schemes and guaranteed pay for its partners.170  In March 
2008, Davis—with the consent of the executive and 
compensation committees—slotted partners at both Dewey 
Ballantine and LeBoeuf into whichever legacy firm’s 
compensation band was higher.171  This led to an 
indiscriminate increase in compensation for all partners.172  
Such a compensation arrangement is only tenable when there 
is continually mounting revenue growth, a scenario that did 
not play out. 
Second, Dewey failed to fully disclose to all partners the 
incentives the firm used to entice rainmakers.173  Specifically, 
as late as the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012, Dewey’s 
partners remained unaware that the firm’s “obligations for 
current and deferred compensation exceeded its earnings by at 
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least $250 million.”174  Dewey’s problems were not revealed to 
most of its partners until it was too late to effectively head off 
the firm’s demise. 
Third, shortly after the initial merger between Dewey 
Ballantine and LeBoeuf Lamb, the LeBoeuf-side partners 
discovered a total of $60 million in obligations.175  Dewey 
delayed other firm obligations to pay these partner 
guarantees.176  This “surprise expense” created resentment 
from the LeBoeuf-side partners.177 
Fourth, once the legal market began improving in 2010 
and 2011, Davis extended new guarantees to at least one 
hundred partners to encourage those rainmakers to stay at the 
firm.178  At a time when the firm needed financial flexibility, 
Davis instead added millions of dollars more debt with these 
guarantees. 
Fifth, the acquisition of partners from other firms and an 
expansion into international markets created a false sense of 
business growth, exposed to Dewey to greater risk, and added 
more unsustainable debt.179 
Lastly, the 2008 recession affected Dewey more than many 
firms, as it significantly impacted Dewey’s corporate practice 
and Leboeuf’s insurance practice.180  In the wake of the 
economic downturn, clients began to realize their increased 
bargaining power and spent less on legal fees and demanded 
additional discounts on legal services.181  Compounding this 
problem, rainmaker partners sent and collected client bills 
late.182  Ultimately, Dewey lacked the necessary revenues to 
cover its obligations.  Upon discovering this deficiency, 
rainmaker partners departed the firm along with many of their 
high-profile clients.183 
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II. SOLUTIONS TO LAW FIRM BANKRUPTCIES 
A. Introduction 
Each law firm bankruptcy covered in this Article was 
unique.  However, a number of similar causes cut across these 
collapses.  These causes include: (1) overreliance on rainmaker 
partners, who in times of financial instability tended to lateral 
out of the troubled firm and take their books of business with 
them;184 (2) the failure of merger negotiations;185 (3) the 
overpayment of partners during or immediately preceding 
times of economic difficulty;186 (4) inability to cope with broader 
economic downturns;187 (5) excessive amounts of firm debt;188 
and finally (6) a lack of oversight of firm finances by non-
rainmaker equity partners.189 
This Part will analyze and recommend possible solutions 
to law firm bankruptcies.190  These solutions are designed to 
confront the structural weaknesses that led to the large firm 
bankruptcies discussed earlier in the Article.  Although these 
suggestions will directly address the overarching problems 
presented in these case studies, these propositions also can 
apply to medium and small law firms.  That said, each law firm 
is different.  Consequently, certain proposed solutions will 
prove more or less effective for a given firm.  For example, a 
small law firm may not be able to employ the market-based 
public trading solution.  However, this same firm may be able 
to avoid bankruptcy by requiring full disclosure of the firm’s 
finances to all partners and/or by applying the unfinished 
business doctrine.  Thus, a given proposed solution—or 
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combination of multiple solutions—may or may not be 
appropriate for a given firm in light of its size and governing 
structure. 
Five possible solutions will be discussed and recommended 
within two overarching categories: market solutions and 
regulatory solutions. Proposed market solutions will be 
analyzed in the following order: (1) creation of a regime in 
which the public can directly invest in law firms; (2) the 
establishment of an intra-firm regulatory system whereby all 
of the firm’s finance, oversight, governance, and risk 
management practices would be disclosed to all firm partners 
on a specified basis; and (3) the adoption of contractual 
restrictions on departing partners.  Proposed regulatory 
solutions will be discussed in the following order: (1) the broad 
legislative enactment of the unfinished business doctrine, a 
common law remedy not currently available in all jurisdictions; 
and (2) regulatory oversight by a governmental agency.  Two 
other solutions—changes to the ABA Model Rules and 
expansion to international markets—will be discussed but 
ultimately rejected. 
B. Market-Based Solutions 
1. Public Investment in Law Firms 
This Article’s first market-based proposal designed to 
stave off law firm bankruptcies is to allow the public to invest 
in law firms in a manner similar to how it currently invests in 
publicly traded companies.  This potential solution has several 
advantages and disadvantages.  The two primary advantages 
are that: (1) law firms will have access to more capital to 
address financial difficulties; and (2) law firms that publicly 
trade their stock will be required to comply with Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) rules and regulations.  These 
requirements would obligate the law firm to publicly file 
certain disclosure documents, such as offering statements and 
periodic financial disclosures.  Failure to comply with SEC 
requirements—such as not making required disclosures, or 
making inaccurate disclosures—could expose firms to potential 
liability.  The prospect of running afoul of the SEC would 
provide heightened accountability by encouraging the timely 
and accurate release of financial information.  The primary 
disadvantages of this approach include: (1) the prospect that 
internal law firm governance will be subject to public scrutiny 
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rather than privately managed by the firm’s lawyers; and (2) 
the fact that non-lawyers will have an ownership stake in—
and hence potential voting membership and control over—the 
law firm.  The prospect of non-lawyer equity holders raises 
possible ethical problems, as (a) non-lawyers could potentially 
make decisions that affect a lawyer’s representation of a client; 
and (b) non-lawyers could potentially accept legal fees as 
profits.  Both (a) and (b) would constitute violations of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.191  The advantages and 
disadvantages of this proposed market-based solution will be 
discussed in further detail below. 
a. Increased Capital Advantage 
In a solution embracing public investment in law firms, 
firms availing themselves of such funding will have another 
capital source on which to draw when faced with financial 
difficulties.  Part II’s case studies starkly illustrate that a 
shortage of capital at key moments is often a harbinger of 
bankruptcy.  Allowing law firms to sell securities to the public 
would give them access to a massive funding pool that they can 
draw on in response to financial difficulties and, ideally, avoid 
plunging into bankruptcy for want of access to capital. 
Oversight would have to be key component of this solution. 
Public investment divorced of regulation would allow a firm to 
use investor money without effective accountability—strongly 
courting financial mismanagement.  Unless a publicly traded 
law firm is exposed to the liabilities that come with public 
trading, additional capital infusion by outside investors would 
only exacerbate the likelihood of bankruptcy.  Thus, increased 
access to capital will be part of effective solution only if it comes 
with oversight. 
b. SEC Requirements Advantage 
Fortunately, this problem would be at least partially 
addressed automatically: public issuance of securities by law 
firms would trigger SEC oversight mandates.  Thus, the second 
advantage of allowing the public to invest in law firms is that 
firms seeking such investment would be subject to SEC 
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2015] LESSONS FROM LAW FIRM BANKRUPTCIES 533 
disclosure requirements similar to those that apply to other 
enterprises that publicly issue stock.  Failure to comply with 
SEC rules and regulations opens the firm—and even 
individuals in leadership roles—to potentially massive 
liability.  This threat would disincentivize the firm and its 
leadership from recklessly spending investors’ money. 
An extended discussion of the liabilities firms and their 
principals could face for violations of SEC regulations is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  However, a brief discussion 
may be helpful.  Whether there would be liability and what 
would be its contours depends on the enabling statute.  For 
example, issuers who conduct a registered deal (that is, a 
securities issuer who is required to register their deal with the 
SEC and does so) may be liable under section 11 of the 
Securities Act.  This Part grants an express private right of 
action to purchasers of securities issued under a registration 
statement that contains materially misleading information as 
of the statement’s effective date.192  Section 11 liability is a 
serious matter: signatories of the registration statement (in 
this case, law firm partners) and directors can be held 
personally liable, and the plaintiff rarely needs to show 
reliance on the misleading information in the statement— 
effectively making section 11 violations judged under a strict 
liability standard.193  Damages are typically calculated by 
subtracting the value of the securities at the time of suit from 
the offering price—with a law firm whose stock value has 
declined precipitously, this gulf may be immense.194 
Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act imposes liability for 
violations of section 5 of the Securities Act, which would cover 
the vast majority of law firm security offerings.195  Section 5, 
broadly speaking, covers SEC disclosure requirements and 
governs the manner of offering securities.196  Section 12(a)(1), 
like section 11, grants a private right of action that implicates 
an effective strict liability standard.197  A successful section 
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12(a)(1) action will result in rescission for the purchaser.198  
Section 12(a)(2) provides another source of liability for public 
offerings,199 again carrying a rescission remedy.200 
Section 17 of the Securities Act does not create a private 
right of action, but grants the SEC a very broad ability to 
punish instances of both fraud and unknowing unjust 
enrichment.201  Rescission and damages are available under 
section 17.  Additionally, a minority of courts have allowed for 
punitive damages.202  Finally, section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 grants an expansive private right of 
action to buyers and sellers of securities in instances of 
intentional or reckless deception or manipulation by anyone 
who violates SEC regulation in connection with the purchase 
or sale of a security.203  All of this is setting aside the possibility 
of criminal liability for violation of the securities laws.204  This 
Article is not designed to predict what SEC rules may apply to 
a law firm’s offering of securities in a given situation, nor does 
it purport to cover every liability situation in the foregoing 
paragraphs.  The salient point is that the SEC and private 
purchasers have no shortage of tools with which to address 
both intentional and unintentional violations of the Securities 
Act. 
Consequently, the first and second advantages of the 
public investment approach may allow a law firm to raise more 
capital while compelling it to disclose important financial 
information.  Public investment would increase firms’ financial 
agility while simultaneously incentivizing the wise use of this 
newfound capital, thanks to the applicability of disclosure 
 
 198. See, e.g., Norwood P. Beveridge, Is Mens Rea Required for a Criminal 
Violation of the Federal Securities Laws?, 52 BUS. LAW.  35, 51 (1996). 
 199. Section 12(b)(2) is not explicitly restricted to public offerings, but this has 
been read in as an effective requirement.  See generally Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 
513 U.S. 561 (1995).  An offering can be quite small and still be characterized as 
“public” for purposes of 12(a)(2) liability. See generally Janet E. Kerr, Ralston 
Redux: Determining Which Section 3 Offerings Are Public Under Section 12(2) 
After Gustafson, 50 SMU L. REV. 175 (1996). 
 200. See, e.g., Therese H. Maynard, Liability Under Section 12(2) of the 
Securities Act of 1933 for Fraudulent Trading in Postdistribution Markets, 32 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 847, 847 n.2 (1991). 
 201. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q. 
 202. See PAUL VIZCARRONDO, JR., LIABILITIES UNDER THE FEDERAL 
SECURITIES LAWS 53 (2013). 
 203. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j. 
 204. For a discussion of criminal violations of insider trader prohibitions, see, 
e.g., Brian J. Carr, Culpable Intent Required for All Criminal Insider Trading 
Convictions After United States v. O’Hagan, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1187 (1999). 
2015] LESSONS FROM LAW FIRM BANKRUPTCIES 535 
requirements and other federal financial regulations.  Apart 
from the threat of liability for regulatory noncompliance, 
disclosure requirements would allow market forces to act as 
another source of pressure on firms to use capital strategically 
and economically.  Failure to efficiently maximize productivity 
and profit would prompt the market to adjust the firm’s value.  
Disclosures would ensure proper investor awareness of firm 
performance, and the level of public investment would 
ultimately respond accordingly. 
c. Public Scrutiny Disadvantage 
Disclosure, however, can be a double-edged sword.  The 
first disadvantage of allowing public investment in law firms 
is the possibility of public scrutiny of a firm’s internal 
governance procedures and financial practices.  This aspect of 
the proposal will likely prove extremely disconcerting to 
lawyers, as firms have traditionally been managed largely free 
from outside influence or intervention.  Depending on the size 
and governance structure of a firm, it may be managed 
exclusively by an Executive Committee or a Managing Partner.  
Allowing firms to issue securities to the public, however, would 
require major changes in law firm governance.  Although many 
law firms are likely to balk at the adoption of a management 
and governance system compliant with applicable statutory 
and SEC regulatory requirements, the potential benefits of 
raising capital from the public may outweigh the 
disadvantages posed by the accompanying public scrutiny. 
d. Non-Lawyer Ownership Disadvantage 
The second major disadvantage of allowing the public to 
invest in law firms is that the issuance of equity securities by 
firms would allow non-lawyers to take an ownership stake in 
the enterprise.  Hence, non-lawyers will have potential voting 
rights and control over the law firm, and would share in profits 
with lawyers.  This raises possible ethical problems such as (a) 
the potential that non-lawyers could make decisions 
influencing a lawyer’s representation of a client; and (b) the 
possibility of non-lawyers accepting legal fees as profits.  Both 
of these outcomes would be ethical violations of the standing 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and under most—if not 
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all—state frameworks.205 
These potential aspects of the public investment solution 
pose serious problems in the first instance, but fortunately 
these concerns can be easily headed off.  First, the prospect of 
non-lawyers taking control of a law firm such that they could 
collectively or individually control the legal representation of a 
client can be avoided. For example, the SEC could require that 
law firms that publicly issue stock must ensure at least a 
simple majority of stock remains in the hands of the attorneys.  
Additionally, the issuance of non-voting stock or other special 
classes of stock could allow for public investment without 
public interference in the day-to-day operations of the firm 
concerning representation of clients.  Second, the prospect of 
having non-lawyers share legal fees could be avoided with the 
adoption of an internal firm-wide profit sharing arrangement 
with non-lawyer employees.206 
e. Conclusion 
This Article endorses a market-based, public investment 
solution to law firm bankruptcies.  This proposal could 
mitigate the financial problems that have driven some of the 
largest and most prestigious law firms into bankruptcy.  In 
fact, this solution would likely increase access to higher quality 
legal services due to capital injection and increased financial 
transparency.  These benefits would outweigh the speculative 
ethical sacrifices, which could be avoided in any case.  This 
Article therefore recommends this market-based solution of 
permitting law firms to publicly issue stock, thereby allowing 
them to adjust to new economic realities and decrease the risk 
of bankruptcy. 
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2. Full Disclosure of Law Firm Financials and Risk 
Management Practices 
a. Introduction 
Second, this Article recommends the adoption of a 
regulatory system under which all of a firm’s finance, 
oversight, governance, and risk management practices are 
disclosed to all firm partners.  As Part II demonstrated, 
prominent law firms that went on to declare bankruptcy often 
had an internal structure under which many lower-ranking 
partners had no knowledge that the firm was experiencing 
financial difficulties until the eleventh hour.  Opaque financial 
disclosure policies—formal and informal—make it very 
difficult for all partners to grasp the true financial health of 
their firm.  A regulatory system demanding increased internal 
transparency would improve a firm’s overall financial 
resiliency by discouraging risky investment, management, and 
financial behavior, while requiring only minimal interference 
with a firm’s internal management and governance.  However, 
marginally widening the circle of transparency to include only 
income partners may not completely prevent poor decision-
making.  Conversely, involving substantially more people in 
the decision-making process could bog down management and 
create internal gridlock.  Ultimately, however, the advantages 
of transparency outweigh its potential downsides.  Any 
pushback on management from newly informed partners will 
likely lead to increased accountability. 
b. Advantages of Full Disclosure 
The primary advantages of this type of internal regulatory 
scheme are in its (1) discouragement of risky investment, 
management, and financial behavior by top decision-makers; 
and (2) its minimal interference with a firm’s internal 
management and governance. 
In Dewey’s case, firm leaders made the decision to extend 
guarantees to rainmakers and incur massive debt without the 
knowledge of second-tier partners.  These decisions, combined 
with the financial crisis in 2008, led to Dewey’s demise.207  
Ultimately, those who made the decisions at Dewey faced few 
consequences from the ancillary partners, the associates who 
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lost their jobs, and the creditors who received only cents on the 
dollar as a result of the liquidation plan.208  This two-tiered 
structure is not unique to Dewey: these types of partnerships 
have become an increasingly common way to structure law 
firm equity ownership.209  In many instances this has led to a 
large equity partner income gap, with equity tier partners 
earning up to eight to ten times more than non-equity 
partners.210  Firms with two-tiered partnership models are also 
more apt to engage in heavy lateral rainmaker hiring: Finley 
Kumble sought to inflate profits by attracting lateral hires and 
their clients in exchange for enormous salaries.211  However, 
this practice increased long-term liabilities, fostered internal 
discord, and led to the firm’s downfall.212  These types of hiring 
practices, along with a growing perception of partnership 
inequality, have the potential to lead to an erosion of 
partnership values.213 
If law firms were required to internally disclose financial 
statements to every law firm partner—instead of only a few 
equity and executive partners—it is unlikely that all partners 
would support the type of risky management behaviors that 
have led to the sort of law firm bankruptcies examined in Part 
II.  Full disclosure policies would serve to tether equity 
partners and non-equity partners together with a common 
purpose.  Furthermore, disclosing financial details to all 
partners would decrease the possibility that a few individuals 
at the top would make imprudent “bets” where the downside 
for the firm is disproportionally large.  This increased 
accountability could act to slow the growth of large firms, but 
would temper the equity partners’ ability to catalyze short-
term but potentially unsustainable expansion by way of lateral 
hiring.  As seen in the cases of Dewey, Finley Kimble, and 
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Coudert, short-term growth and oversized guarantee of 
payments have the potential to lead to unsustainable long-
term liabilities terminating in bankruptcy.214 
Moreover, this proposed solution is reasonable: although 
it requires internal interference with law firm management 
and governance, this interference is minimal and less drastic 
than that required by the public investment solution.  
Admittedly, widening the circle of transparency can be a 
difficult change to effectuate.  Nevertheless, it is an approach 
some firms are beginning to independently adopt.215  Unlike 
the first proposed solution to law firm bankruptcies, disclosure 
to all of a firm’s partners keeps the information in the firm as 
public disclosures are unnecessary.  Moreover, implementation 
of this scheme would not require any increased exposure to 
liability under SEC regulations, nor would it raise any direct 
ethical problems. 
c. Disadvantages of Full Disclosure 
Disadvantages of applying this type of full disclosure 
policy include (1) a possible failure to completely prevent poor 
decision-making; and (2) the involvement of more people in the 
decision-making process, thereby potentially slowing 
managerial effectiveness and causing internal gridlock. 
Conceptually, the goals of increased transparency are to 
prevent unsustainable distribution levels to partners and 
establish wider accountability for firm decision-making.  In 
Thelen’s case, however, a perception of inefficient management 
and the revelation of poor capital allocation led to attorney 
attrition rather than a push for better decision-making.216  
Thus, it is difficult to say with certainty whether increased 
financial transparency would have saved a firm like Thelen 
from impending doom.  Nevertheless, it is unlikely that a policy 
of increased disclosure would have negatively affected a firm in 
Thelen’s position.  A clearer view of firm financials could have 
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decreased partner angst, minimized uncertainty, and fostered 
more constructive problem-solving discussions. 
Additionally, making full disclosures to all partners may 
decrease the overall operational effectiveness of management. 
In a two-tiered partnership law firm, income partners have 
different compensation schemes than equity partners.217  
Equity partners have a stake in the firm and its furtherance, 
and thus typically are naturally held more accountable for 
their decisions in guiding the firm.218  In contrast, income 
partners are incentivized by a larger paycheck and over the 
long term are incentivized only by the more removed prospect 
of ensuring job security.  Full financial transparency could 
create competing interests within both tiers of partners.  At the 
very least, it would not serve to correct this misalignment of 
incentives. However, this potential for internal conflict should 
largely be offset by the equity partners’ superior bargaining 
power, leading non-equity partners to dispute only decisions 
that could make or break the firm.  Importantly, the two tiers 
of partners are ultimately guided by the shared interest of 
maintaining the continued existence and profitability of the 
firm.  Although at many points the interests of the two parties 
may diverge, financial disclosure would ensure a balance of 
oversight is maintained and the common threads linking the 
partner classes remain intact. 
d. Conclusion 
In sum, this Article recommends the mandatory disclosure 
of law firm finance, oversight, governance, and risk 
management practices to all partners.  The advantages that 
this solution presents outweigh the drawbacks.  This second 
solution may be implemented in conjunction with the first 
public investment solution to more effectively bolster the 
ability of a firm to ward off bankruptcy.  Large law firms may 
benefit from both public disclosures to the SEC and internal 
firm disclosures to their partners.  For smaller and medium 
sized firms unable to go public, this solution may be a more 
promising method to mitigate the possibility of bankruptcy. 
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3. Contractual Restrictions on Departing Partners 
a. Introduction 
This Article’s third proposal to combat law firm 
bankruptcies is to impose contractual restrictions on departing 
partners.  An attorney would enter into these restrictive 
covenants when joining a firm, and these covenants would 
restrict the departed partner’s ability to work with current 
clients of the firm, poach current clients of the firm, or practice 
in a specific geographic region for a specific period of time.  
Simply stated, contractual restrictions would act to discourage 
rainmakers from departing a law firm.  Additionally, such 
restrictions could be implemented flexibly according to market 
conditions and firm employment negotiations.  This solution is 
not without its challenges, however.  Many jurisdictions have 
a strong presumption against the enforceability of restrictive 
employment covenants.219  Furthermore, firms implementing 
such contractual restrictions may risk deterring top talent 
from joining.  In light of its benefits, however, this Article 
ultimately endorses this third proposal as a conservative 
solution with little extraneous and unforeseen risk. 
b. Contractual Restrictions to Prevent Partner 
Departure 
 First, the restrictive covenants this Article endorses will 
impose at least some burden on the earning capabilities of a 
departing partner and their ability to practice after leaving the 
firm.  Ideally, this will act to discourage rainmakers from 
cavalierly leaving firms.  Part II presented several examples 
where law firm bankruptcies have been precipitated or 
hastened by the departure of rainmaker partners.  This 
strategy would be tailored so as not to categorically prevent a 
rainmaker from leaving, but would be designed to make it 
more difficult for a large proportion of rainmakers to leave in 
a short time span.  This solution, however, may have the 
unintended consequence of discouraging potential rainmakers 
from initially joining the firm. Accordingly, the exact contours 
of such restrictions will often vary a case-by-case basis. 
The practice of law has shed many prior idiosyncrasies and 
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has evolved into something more reminiscent of other 
commercial enterprises.  As such, the rationale for treating the 
legal profession as sacrosanct is significantly weakened, even 
after considering the enhanced ethical code of the profession.220  
Reasonable forfeiture clauses on withdrawing partners would 
not create an absolute restriction on practice.221  Rather, a 
properly drawn agreement would serve to balance the interests 
of the client, the withdrawing partner, and the law firm.222 
If law firms and lawyers did not want to be bound by such 
agreements, then they would be free not to enter into such 
contracts.  The market would be the ultimate arbiter of 
whether these contracts are viable options in the legal 
profession.  In a strong economic climate, law firms would have 
less leverage in negotiating such contractual restrictions.  On 
the other hand, in such a climate attorneys are less apt to 
search for new job opportunities and the influx of rainmakers 
would not be as significant.  Alternatively, in a down market 
where attorney laterals are more common, well-positioned 
firms could include employment restrictions in a reasonable 
negotiation. 
Consequently, as these agreements are only effective to 
the extent of law firm and attorney participation, this proposal 
stands as a conservative solution with little extraneous and 
unforeseen risk. 
c. Presumption Against Enforceability 
 There is a strong presumption against the enforceability 
of such restrictive covenants.  Although this is not the case in 
every jurisdiction, this would pose a roadblock to widespread 
adoption of this solution.  In order to circumvent this barrier, 
there would need to be national reform either through 
legislative or judicial action. 
In most jurisdictions, ABA Model Rule 5.6 would act to 
prohibit any attorney from entering into a restrictive covenant.  
Rule 5.6 prohibits a lawyer from making or offering a 
partnership or employment agreement that restricts the right 
of a lawyer to practice after the termination of the 
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relationship.223  This effectively limits the availability of 
contractual restrictions.  Decisions like Cohen v. Lord Day & 
Lord appear to affirm this limitation in imposing an absolute 
prohibition of compensation or benefit forfeitures by attorneys 
in employment contracts.224  This view has become 
commonplace among a majority of jurisdictions.225 
However, some jurisdictions have proven themselves 
exceptions to this general proposition.  California, for example, 
has upheld restrictive covenants in its courts.  In Howard v. 
Babcock, the California Supreme Court held that a contractual 
restriction on departing partners in a law practice was 
enforceable provided it was geographically limited and the cost 
to the departing partner was reasonable.226  Specifically, the 
court stated that partners who practice in competition with the 
partnership forfeit the right to certain withdrawal benefits.227  
Furthermore, because it was a “reasonable” restriction on the 
lawyer’s right to practice, the covenant was enforceable.228  The 
court sought to balance the interest of a law firm in stable 
business against the interests of a client in having an attorney 
of their choice.229  The restrictions on withdrawing partners 
were limited to a specified geographical area and imposed a toll 
on competition similar to liquidated damages.230  Additionally, 
the clause providing for damages from breach would only be 
valid if the calculated damages were the result of a reasonable 
effort by the parties to estimate any loss potentially 
sustained.231  Thus, Howard did not consider the restrictions 
on practice to be impermissibly against public policy or to 
interfere with professional conduct rules prohibiting 
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restrictions on practice.232 
Likewise, in Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior Court 
the California Court of Appeals held that a departing partner 
could agree to compensate their former law firm if the partner 
represented clients previously represented by the firm from 
which they left.233  The court determined that the restrictive 
covenant—forfeiting any financial interest the departing 
partner would otherwise have in the firm—did not expressly or 
fully prohibit the withdrawn partner’s practice of law or 
representation of any client.234  Only where a restrictive 
covenant prohibits an attorney from practicing law altogether 
would the agreement be invalid.235  Thus, the court found that 
such a financial restriction on the withdrawal of a partner was 
allowable.236 
Similarly, in Fearnow v. Ridenour, Swenson, Cleere & 
Evans, P.C. the Arizona Supreme Court held that neither 
Arizona Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 5.6 nor ABA Model 
Rule 5.6 expressly prohibit imposition of a “financial 
disincentive” on a departing lawyer.237  The court found the 
reasoning from Howard compelling, holding that Rule 5.6 only 
prohibits an agreement that restricts a lawyer’s right to 
practice after departing a law firm.238  Covenants that impose 
“disincentives” on withdrawing lawyers without restricting 
practice would turn on a reasonableness standard.239  Because 
financial disincentives do not necessarily restrict a lawyer’s 
right to practice, the court held that restrictive covenants are 
not categorically void and the validity of the restriction will 
depend on the reasonableness of the disincentive.240 
Applying the reasoning from Howard and Haight would 
produce a framework that allows firms to restrict partner 
withdrawal by instituting a contractual penalty or toll.  
Drawing on the rationale in Howard, the penalty would be 
tailored to apply only to the practice of law within a specific 
 
 232. Howard, 863 P.2d, at 425. 
 233. Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior Court, 234 Cal. App. 3d 963, 969–
70 (Cal. App. 1991). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Fearnow v. Ridenour, Swenson, Cleere & Evans, P.C., 138 P.3d 723, 726 
(Ariz. 2005). 
 238. Id. at 728. 
 239. Id. at 729. 
 240. Id. 
2015] LESSONS FROM LAW FIRM BANKRUPTCIES 545 
geographic region.  The threat of the toll would provide 
leverage, allowing law firms to limit withdrawal of partners 
who would otherwise take clients from them.  That said, it 
would be important to ensure that the toll is part of a reasoned 
and negotiated process between the law firm and partner. 
Similarly, Fearnow’s rationale allows a law firm to enter 
into restrictive covenants limited to financial disincentives 
with departing partners.  A law firm could make it less 
lucrative for departing partners to leave the firm, making 
partners face a financial disincentive without a restriction on 
practice.  This would balance the two public interests involved.  
The first interest to be vindicated is the allowance of attorneys 
to withdraw from a law firm, practice at another firm, and 
accept employment with whichever client desires to retain the 
withdrawing attorney.  This runs to the advantage of both the 
departing attorney and the prospective client.  The second 
public interest served is allowing the remaining partners to 
maintain financial stability by keeping the departing partner’s 
capital share and accounts receivable to replace lost client 
revenue.  The use of financial disincentives in restrictive 
covenants could therefore alleviate the type of revenue shocks 
that push firms towards the precipice of bankruptcy. 
One potential downside comes in the form of 
unpredictability: when a court applies the reasonableness 
standard to the financial disincentives at issue and finds them 
too burdensome or restrictive, the court could void the 
covenant as an improper restraint on the practice of law.  
Though it may be difficult to predict the result of such 
litigation, especially in the early stages of the implementation 
of this solution, the outcome would ultimately turn on a factual 
determination by the court.  Thus, provided the law firm uses 
reasonable financial disincentives, restrictive covenants would 
represent a viable method of limiting partner departures. 
Another barrier to implementing contractual restrictions 
similar to those upheld in Howard, Haight, and Fearnow is the 
reality that California and Arizona are in the minority of 
jurisdictions that allow the imposition of such restrictions.  
Although many jurisdictions have stopped short of consistently 
upholding California-style restrictive covenants, some 
jurisdictions have nonetheless begun to take a more flexible 
view.241  Ideally, California’s large legal market and Arizona’s 
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view of financial disincentives will generate the initial 
momentum required for widespread implementation of such 
contractual agreements.  In any case, while there is not 
currently pervasive acceptance of this prospective solution, it 
has the immediate potential to be successfully applied on a 
limited scale. 
d. Conclusion 
In sum, this Article recommends that law firms consider 
the use of contractual restrictions on a case-by-case basis.  This 
solution is very flexible, and carries little risk of driving away 
talent in light of its ability to be molded to the needs of the 
contracting parties.  Firms within states that share 
California’s approach to contractual restrictions will be in the 
best position to implement restrictive covenants on departing 
rainmakers.  Firms outside of such jurisdictions may advocate 
for changes to the Rules of Professional Responsibility adopted 
in their respective states.  If successful, this would allow 
restrictive covenants on withdrawing partners similar to the 
one in Howard.  This Article’s third proposal represents 
another market-oriented solution that avoids the sometimes 
heavy hand of governmental regulation, and may be viewed as 
preferable to those seeking a means of interdicting law firm 
bankruptcies that arises largely from the initiative and under 
the direction of the legal profession.  Many in the field would 
prefer to self-police, but if the foregoing solutions prove 
insufficient standing alone they may need to be augmented by 
regulatory-based approaches. 
C. Regulatory-Based Solutions 
1. Legislative Enactment of the Unfinished Business 
Doctrine 
a. Introduction 
This Article advocates the legislative enactment of the 
“unfinished business doctrine,” originally a common law 
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remedy, as a regulatory-based solution.  This proposed solution 
could inhibit the sort of rainmaker exodus that exacerbates the 
risk of bankruptcy.  The unfinished business doctrine allows a 
bankruptcy trustee to “sue for profits generated by work that 
partners started at their old law firms and took to their new 
positions, such as continuing cases.”242  As demonstrated 
earlier in this Article, rainmaker partners departing from 
financially troubled firms have been a major contributing 
factor to recent law firm bankruptcies.  At present, rainmakers 
can freely depart their firms as the legal profession views 
individual clients as loyal and attached to the particular 
lawyer who represents said clients.243  Previously, clients were 
viewed as belonging to a firm rather than a possession of a 
particular partner.244 
b. Advantages of the Unfinished Business Doctrine 
Pursuant to the unfinished business doctrine, “absent an 
agreement to the contrary, partners in a dissolved law firm 
have a duty to account to the dissolved firm and their former 
partners for all fees generated from work in progress at the 
time of the firm’s dissolution, in accordance with their 
percentage interests in the firm.”245  In sum, “pending matters 
are uncompleted transactions that require winding up after 
dissolution, and are therefore partnership assets subject to 
post-dissolution distribution.”246 
Thus, adopting the unfinished business doctrine on a 
state-by-state basis would help prevent law firm bankruptcies 
because departing partners would have to pay back to their 
former firm the amount equal to the expenses incurred by the 
firm pre-dissolution on a given case or controversy.  Attorneys 
typically do not like this doctrine because it “enslaves them to 
the dissolved firm,”247 but it would serve as a powerful 
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incentive to partners to redouble their efforts to avoid the 
dissolution of their firm. 
c. Limitations of the Unfinished Business Doctrine 
The unfinished business doctrine, however, is not absolute 
in its application.  First, as the 1984 California Court of Appeal 
decision in Jewell v. Boxer “makes clear, the unfinished 
business doctrine is purely a default rule, meaning that 
partners may contract out of it.”248  These agreements are often 
know as “Jewell waivers.”249  This type of waiver eliminates 
financial and legal obligations of departed partners to former 
firms, freeing them of any continuing duties.250 
Second, departing rainmakers will often continue the 
unfinished business, subject to the unfinished business 
doctrine restrictions, because these clients “are frequently the 
best sources of new matters, and those clients would be 
unlikely to furnish new business if the partner responsible for 
their existing matters abandoned them.”251  Furthermore, the 
unfinished business doctrine does not apply to new matters 
between the departing lawyer and the client the partner took 
with them from their previous firm.252  These realities may 
mitigate the strength of the departure disincentive created by 
the doctrine in individual instances. 
Third, when “the dissolved partnership winds up its 
affairs, the interested parties may reasonably compromise any 
unfinished business claims” in order to separate ties between 
the previous firm and the departing partner.253  All in all, the 
utility of this solution depends on the scope and nature of its 
implementation—and contracting parties have a wide degree 
of latitude in that regard. 
d. Conclusion 
This Article contends that the application of the 
unfinished business doctrine is a reasonable solution because 
it can—or at least should—only be applied to expenses that a 
departing rainmaker incurs on a matter they take with them 
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from their old to their new firm when clients follow the partner 
in their move.  This Article does not endorse the capture of 
income from a rainmaker’s new, future cases deriving from the 
rainmaker’s book of business that they took with them.  Such 
a proposal would greatly impede a lawyer’s ability to ever leave 
a firm, out of a concern that the former firm could sue the 
departing rainmaker at any point in the future—the partner’s 
revenue stream would ever be in jeopardy.  Rather, this Article 
recommends the unfinished business doctrine be used to cover 
the damages directly incurred from the departure of these 
rainmakers.  Although calculating damages from such 
departures may be difficult in some instances, this Article’s 
proposed framework is clearly preferable to an expansive 
application of the doctrine that would effectively prevent 
attorneys from moving between firms—such an inhibiting 
application would be vigorously resisted by the profession, and 
would likely not survive legal challenge.  The limited version 
of the unfinished business doctrine that this Article endorses 
is currently a common law remedy not available in all 
jurisdictions; thus, in order for the doctrine to be consistently 
available across states, it would have to be legislatively 
enacted. 
2. Regulatory Oversight by Governmental Agency 
a. Introduction 
The tension between the formal regulatory powers of 
quasi-judicial agencies and private, autonomous self-
regulation permeates many sectors of the modern American 
economy—including finance, medicine, manufacturing, oil and 
gas, education, and others.  This Part will explore the 
possibility of regulatory oversight of the legal industry by a 
dedicated governmental agency.  Ultimately, this Article 
endorses this approach as another measure to combat the 
growing prevalence of law firm bankruptcies. 
The potential operation and success of a legal oversight 
agency can be explored by reference to existing governmental 
oversight agencies.  One such regulatory authority, the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)—formed 
on June 6, 1934 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934254—
is tasked with the enforcement of federal securities laws and 
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regulation of securities markets and the securities industry 
generally.255  In the pursuit of its statutory mandate, the 
mission of the SEC has come to embody the dual purposes of 
securities market regulation and the prevention of corporate 
abuses relating to the issuance, purchase, and sale of 
securities.  The devastating Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the 
nation’s subsequent slide into the depths of the Great 
Depression starkly highlighted the need for this quasi-judicial 
regulatory agency.  Although the necessity for oversight in the 
securities arena was clearly demonstrated, doubt remains 
concerning the actual effectiveness of SEC regulatory and 
oversight action in staving off severe market fluctuations and 
interdicting serious abuses.  The agency’s failure to prevent the 
2008 financial crisis and associated events such as the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the severe liquidity crisis 
that nearly wiped out AIG, or to timely detect the Madoff 
investment scandal or the abuses at Enron, have significantly 
tarnished the reputation of the organization.  That said, the 
jury is still out on the overall effectiveness of the SEC and 
whether increased regulatory oversight by the agency would 
have prevented these financial scandals and market shocks.  
The SEC did step up its enforcement actions after the 2008 
crash, bringing major actions against such market players as 
Goldman Sachs,256 Citigroup,257 J.P. Morgan,258 and Credit 
Suisse.259  Uneven track record aside, the SEC at its ideal 
presents an example of a long-standing government agency 
with a broad sphere of responsibility in the market and a 
variety of tools with which to carry out its mandates. 
Another example of an oversight body is the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), a non-profit 
corporation established by Congress to oversee the audits of 
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public companies.260  The Board’s primary objectives are the 
protection of investor interests and assurance of accurate, 
transparent, and independent drafting of audit reports.  The 
PCAOB is not without its critics, who point to some of the same 
market failures that the SEC failed to prevent as evidence of 
the accounting oversight body’s questionable effectiveness. In 
the view of its most fervent detractors, the PCAOB exists 
mainly as a hurdle slowing the consummation of commercial 
deals and the achievement of valid business objectives.261  The 
Board’s proponents contend that the PCAOB is a necessary 
reaction to the accounting scandals of the early 2000s and an 
important component of the broader government effort to 
protect investors.262  An extended debate concerning the 
effectiveness of the PCAOB is not within the scope of this 
Article.  Suffice it to say that the divergence of opinions 
concerning both the SEC and PCAOB demonstrates the 
controversy that will attend any attempt by a governmental or 
quasi-governmental agency to regulate the market behavior of 
private actors. 
Relevantly to the purpose of this Article, the SEC and 
PCAOB stand as prime exemplars of the general form that a 
hypothetical governmental Legal Oversight Board (“LOB”) 
might take.  Inspired in part by the SEC’s and PCAOB’s 
regulation of their respective fields, this Article endorses the 
creation of a quasi-judicial governmental agency (i.e., the LOB) 
as an alternative or complementary approach to combat the 
prevalence of law firm bankruptcies.  To act as an effective 
mechanism in the interdiction of firm bankruptcies, the LOB 
would require of law firms certain disclosures to the public—
financial statements, annual reports, profits per partner 
ratios, and so forth.  Disclosures of these financial and other 
indices would be required regardless of whether a given firm 
decided to make a public offering of securities pursuant to this 
Article’s public investment market-based solution. On the 
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other hand, the issuance of securities triggering SEC oversight 
and disclosure obligations would render the LOB requirements 
imposed on an issuing firm largely superfluous—though they 
certainly would be minimally burdensome when imposed in 
addition to LOB requirements. In any case, this Article’s fifth 
proposed solution to law firm bankruptcy has a significantly 
broader reach than its first recommended approach. 
b. Advantages and Disadvantages of Regulatory 
Oversight 
It would be disingenuous to claim that this proposed 
solution would not encounter strident opposition from the legal 
profession.  The regulatory activities of the LOB would 
necessarily interfere with the standing internal governance 
practices of law firm management.  Notwithstanding this 
invasiveness and the backlash it will engender, this Article 
contends that an LOB could still represent a viable means of 
reducing the risk of law firm bankruptcies.  This contention 
has several grounds for support. 
First, the potential objections of those in the legal industry 
to the LOB would largely sound as echoes: opponents of the 
SEC and PCAOB argued that said entities would ruin the 
securities and financial industries.263  Clearly, these dire 
predictions were not vindicated—and no characteristic 
inherent in the legal profession or necessary to the operation 
of the hypothetical LOB suggests that similar doomsaying 
would prove any more cogent.  Previously mentioned criticisms 
of the SEC and PCAOB notwithstanding, most individuals 
would agree that the two agencies have on balance increased 
stability, transparency, and accountability in the securities 
markets and accounting profession.  Additionally, it is worth 
remembering that lawyers are not the only stakeholders with 
interest implicated in the prevention of law firm bankruptcies. 
Surely their interests are important, but they do not stand 
alone. 
Second, this proposed solution is proportionate to the 
harm it seeks to prevent.  Admittedly, the creation of an LOB 
would represent a significant shift in governmental regulation 
of the legal profession.  However, the scale, impact, and 
mounting frequency of law firm bankruptcies demonstrates 
that some sort of effective action must be taken—and effective 
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responses to large systemic deficiencies generally introduce 
significant change to the system.  Law firm bankruptcies—
especially those large collapses profiled in Part II—have 
destabilized the legal market in general and have contributed 
to the broader economic downturn.  Though most evident in 
the lead-up to and wake of the 2008 financial crisis, a law firm 
bankruptcy carries with it the potential for significant negative 
ripple effects.  Under this Article’s public investment solution, 
not all firms will choose to publicly issue securities—effectively 
taking them outside the ambit of the sort of SEC oversight that 
would prove helpful in reducing the likelihood of financial ruin.  
This Article’s regulatory agency approach, however, would 
ensure that all law firms are comprehensively regulated such 
that it will be substantially less likely that law firms will go 
bankrupt and negatively impact the overall economy. 
 Third, this recommendation presupposes that a 
hypothetical LOB would be responsive to the concerns of the 
legal profession.  Although the LOB could theoretically be 
structured in such a way that impermissibly interferes in 
attorney-client relationships, it is well within the realm of 
possibility to organize the LOB such that it could regulate the 
legal profession in a way that would not cause its regulatory 
power to interfere with a lawyer’s ethical duties to his or her 
client.  The LOB solution is intended to address law firm 
governance, financial, and management issues that could 
result in law firm bankruptcies, harm the legal profession, or 
impede client access to legal services.  The LOB is neither 
intended to be a bureaucracy that micromanages attorney-
client relationships nor is it meant to drastically interfere with 
law firm governance structures.  It is worth noting that any 
LOB would doubtlessly be staffed mostly or wholly by lawyers, 
who surely would not be completely blind to the concerns of the 
profession. 
c. Conclusion 
 In sum, this Article recommends the creation of a quasi-
judicial agency—such as the hypothetical LOB—whose 
regulations would require that law firms publicly disclose their 
financial statements, annual reports, profits per partner 
ratios, and other relevant metrics. 
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D. Non-Recommended Solutions 
1. Changes to ABA Model Rules 
Another potential response designed to mitigate the risk 
of law firm bankruptcies is the revision of the ABA Model 
Rules.264  At least one critic postulates that enacting ABA 
Model Rules mandating financial reporting by law firms or 
requiring a certain ethical standard of law firm governance 
may prove an effective means of combating law firm 
bankruptcies.265  This Article will discuss the potential benefits 
of enacting ABA Model Rules requiring the maintenance of 
minimum standards of firm operation, such as mandating 
financial report disclosures or setting threshold levels of 
incurring debt.  Although such revisions are intriguing in 
concept—and represent a potentially effective solution—this 
Article ultimately declines to endorse such an approach.  The 
ABA is simply not in a position to impose any of the approaches 
discussed earlier in this Article, and no effective alternative 
approach presents itself. 
The ABA Model Rules provide general guidance266 and 
impose ethical duties on lawyers to behave and act with the 
utmost respect for the profession.267  The Model Rules have the 
potential to act as a vehicle through which the ABA could 
attempt to head off a future onslaught of law firm 
bankruptcies.  “Attempt” being the key word: the ABA’s limited 
authority would prove a major deficiency of this approach.  The 
American Bar Association only imposes ethical obligations and 
guidance. Ultimately the self-governing body can do little to 
unilaterally impose a market-based solution, statutorily codify 
an unfinished business doctrine, create a regulatory oversight 
government agency, or provide some other effective vehicle for 
interdicting firm bankruptcies. 
The current Model Rules would prove hostile to the 
implementation of an approach imposing contractual 
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restrictions on departing partners, with Rule 5.6 being directly 
adverse.268  Under this Rule, a lawyer cannot restrict the right 
of another lawyer to practice after termination of the 
relationship between the two.  In order for an approach 
embracing contractual restrictions to succeed—or even make 
the steps towards getting off the ground—the ABA would have 
to revamp or eliminate the current rule.  However, the ABA is 
unlikely to take such drastic measures,269 because employment 
at-will has long been the rule under the common law.270 
The ABA is probably capable of adopting an ethical rule 
mandating that law firms institute an intra-firm regulatory 
system.  The adoption of an intra-firm regulatory system could 
allow for the implementation of a variety of procedures and 
requirements having the ultimate effect of financial 
stabilization of firms.  For example, an ABA Model Rule could 
require that all of a firm’s finance, oversight, governance, and 
risk management practices would be disclosed to all firm 
partners.  This would, for the reasons discussed earlier, 
represent a viable approach towards combating the recurring 
implosions of law firms.271  In another example, the ABA could 
set threshold levels of firm debt.  Part II demonstrated how 
firms often engage in aggressive lateral expansion maneuvers 
by incurring excessive debt and promising hefty bonuses and 
salaries to rainmaker partners.  The incurrence of these 
liabilities can help tip a firm towards collapse, not in the least 
by significantly reducing its financial maneuverability and 
ability to effectively respond to changing market conditions.  In 
theory, if an ABA Model Rule created bands or tiers of firm 
 
 268. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6(a) (2013) (“A lawyer shall not 
participate in offering or making: . . . a partnership, shareholders, operating, 
employment, or other similar type of agreement that restricts the right of a 
lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement 
concerning benefits upon retirement . . . .”). 
 269. See 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master and Servant § 43 (1970); Monge v. Beebe 
Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 132 (1974) (commenting that “the employer has long 
ruled the workplace with an iron hand by reason of the common-law rule that [a 
hiring for an indefinite period of time] is presumed to be at will and terminable 
at will by either party”). 
 270. William L. Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of 
Employer Privilege, 21 IDAHO L. REV. 201, 202 (1985) (commenting that the 
concept of employment-at-will emerged from times of “unbridled, laissez-faire 
expansionism, social Darwinism, and rugged individualism”). 
 271. Kowalski supra note 264, at 3 (noting that the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct and the Model Code of Professional Conduct are strangely silent on the 
issue of law firm governance). 
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sizes with corresponding debt-incurring limits, firms would be 
encouraged to maintain more reasonable amounts of debt.272 
The actual implementation of an intra-firm regulatory 
system through the ABA Model Rules—such as through a Rule 
requiring financial transparency between partners—could be 
achieved without overly impinging on the ability of law firm 
management to make financial decisions in the near term.  The 
ABA could create a new, broadly worded Model Rule 5.8; such 
a Rule might state some variation of “law firms shall 
implement a law firm governance system that reveals 
transparent financial information to partners.”273  This broad 
language avoids undue operational interference, but it is 
important not to read its mandatory character too strongly. 
Changes to the ABA Model Rules might at best prove 
influential, pushing law firms to begin taking effective steps 
towards addressing the systematic weaknesses that have the 
tendency to magnify financial difficulties into the disastrous 
and uncontrollable events that suck firms into the abyss.  
However, such revisions to the Rules are unlikely to present 
effective solutions in their own right.274  Effective systemic 
reform will hinge on mandates or powerful incentive/
disincentive combinations; a pitched struggle is not often won 
through suggestion. 
The ABA Model Rules do not have the force and effect of 
statutory law, and do not impose stringent liability when a 
lawyer fails to comply.275  Instead, every state in the country 
has a disciplinary authority that governs the investigation and 
 
 272. The approach, undoubtedly, would face numerous practical problems.  
For example, how can the ABA predict what constitutes a “reasonable debt” given 
a firm’s size?  This seems outside the subject matter expertise of the body.  
Furthermore, restricting debt would eliminate the entrepreneurship 
opportunities and growth potential of modern law firms.  Lastly, law firm 
governance seems to be a matter more suitable for micro-management on the firm 
level rather than macro-management by an entity such as the ABA. 
 273. C.f. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(3) (2013) (“A lawyer 
shall . . . keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); id. at R. 5.5(a) (“A lawyer shall not practice law in a 
jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that 
jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.” (emphasis added)). 
 274. A legislative decree or a regulatory oversight board requirement may be 
better suited to implement the spirit of the Rule. 
 275. See generally id. at PMBLE AND SCOPE 19–20 (2013) (stating that failure 
to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis for 
invoking the disciplinary process, but that violation of a rule should not itself give 
rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption in 
such a case that a legal duty as been breached). 
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discipline of delinquent attorneys pursuant to the state’s own 
rules of professional conduct.276  Though probation and 
suspension sometimes occur, complaint proceedings ending in 
disbarment or criminal liability are exceedingly rare in 
proportion to the total number of complaints filed.277  The ABA 
does not vigorously engage in broad disciplinary action.  
Despite the elaborate and widely-encompassing guidance 
framework created by the Model Rules, the overwhelming 
number of disciplinary actions brought by the ABA relate 
primarily to escrow account defalcations and disbarments of 
convicted felons.278  For all the possible permutations of ethical 
quandaries explored by the Multistate Professional 
Responsibility, the Model Rules in practice merely provide 
general guidance and impose (often amorphous) ethical duties 
on lawyers to behave and act with the utmost respect for the 
profession.279  Advisory guidelines by their very nature carry 
no strong coercive mechanism to force compliance—in short, 
they can be safely ignored by those who choose to reject them.  
If a Model Rule addressing law firm governance and finance 
designed to address the concerns leading to firm bankruptcies 
could be successfully constructed, enforcement remains the 
ultimate—and perhaps insurmountable—challenge. 
The question of enforcement aside, the Model Rules tend 
not to provide clear guidance in many marginal ethical 
situations.  Absent some clear prohibitions, the Rules are very 
gray—their language is imprecise, and sometimes appear to 
present internal inconsistencies.  Drafting a Rule consistent 
with the tenor of the existing Rules—and that avoids running 
directly counter to standing precepts—presents a challenge 
that should not be underestimated.  In an example of the 
 
 276. Typically the disciplinary authority of every state is the State Bar of each 
state, although some states vary from this model.  See, e.g., About Us, MINN. 
LAWYERS PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY BD. OFFICE OF LAWYERS PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY, http://lprb.mncourts.gov/AboutUs/Pages/default.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2014) (stating that the Minneosta disciplinary body consists of 
twenty-three members appointed by the Minnesota Supreme Court to oversee 
and administer the state lawyer discipline system). 
 277. See generally 2011 Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems (S.O.L.D.), AM. 
BAR ASSOC. CT’R FOR PROF. RESPONSIBILITY STANDING COMM. ON PROF. 
DISCIPLINE (May 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/professional_responsibility/2011_sold_final_report.authcheckda
m.pdf (containing charts and statistics of each jurisdictions lawyer discipline 
systems and rates). 
 278. Kowalski, supra note 264, at 4. 
 279. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT PMBL. AND SCOPE 5, 9 (2013). 
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tensions embodied in the current Model Rules, Rule 5.2 
imposes on a subordinate lawyer a continuing duty to abide by 
ethical standards in executing orders from another lawyer.  
However, it simultaneously provides that a subordinate lawyer 
will not violate ethical standards if he acts in accordance with 
a supervisory lawyer’s “reasonable resolution of an arguable 
question of professional duty.”280  The language of Rule 5.2 
leaves the associate lawyer at a difficult crossroad in which the 
lawyer is either left in uncertainty or the Rule itself becomes 
minimally enforced.  The Rules recognize that ethics are not 
often amenable to precise ex ante judgments.  The Rules, in the 
main, embrace a high level of ambiguity; this may very well be 
one of their strengths.  It is not, however, an ideal 
characteristic of a regime intended to effectively address 
financial conduct and organizational governance. 
Rule 3.2 stands as another example of the tensions in the 
Model Rules.  Under this Rule, an attorney is required to make 
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the 
client’s interests.  The operation of this Rule can place the 
ethical demands incumbent on attorneys in conflict with the 
wishes of their clients.  Ethically, the attorney must expedite 
litigation—but should the client’s interests demand prolonged 
litigation, the attorney arguably does not violate Model Rule 
3.2 in the pursuit of such a strategy.  The lesson to be taken 
from this is that broad rules will fail to capture the diversity of 
factual situations in the real world, and may be at odds with 
the attorney’s vindication of client interests.  For our purposes, 
if a new ABA Model Rule mandated law firm financial 
disclosures, the Rule may contradict and directly interfere with 
a lawyer’s duty to zealously represent their clients or uphold 
their client’s confidences.  An ABA Model Rule aiming to 
prevent future law firm bankruptcies has the undesirable 
propensity to place lawyers in this ethical grey zone and not 
yield significant changes. 
Law firm governance is a cultural matter best resolved 
with a commitment to high standards of sound financial 
practice.  The impact of a new ABA Model Rule would not only 
be minimal, but such a rule would likely be completely 
 
 280. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.2(b) (2013).  To say that this 
leaves much to individual interpretation is to significantly understate matters.  
See, e.g., Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience by Subordinate Attorneys: 
Lessons from Social Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 451, 466–70 (2007). 
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disregarded by partners of law firms.  As necessary as the 
Model Rules are to the preservation of the profession’s sanctity, 
ethical obligations advising broad behaviors cannot compare to 
the force of an absolute statutory command nor to the 
resiliency of a commitment to personal accountability.  As 
such, looking to the Model Rules for salvation would ultimately 
prove entirely naïve. 
2. Expansion to International Markets 
The Coudert case study starkly demonstrates that 
aggressive expansion into global markets—at first blush 
seemingly an opportunity to tap into new and lucrative 
revenue streams, and a viable method of counteracting 
existing financial difficulties—may in fact act as a major 
contributor to a firm’s demise.  Global growth can provide new 
markets and prestige for law firms—but as this subpart will 
illustrate, it should not be used as a hedge for law firms to 
stave off bankruptcy. International expansion is an ill-advised 
solution to financial difficulties, as (1) firms have a 
disproportionate dependency on future revenue during periods 
of expansion; (2) global markets have more associated risk; and 
(3) the interconnectivity of modern markets does not allow for 
sufficient diversification.  Thus, although international 
expansion may be valuable if prudently employed, it is not 
recommended as solution to combat potential law firm 
bankruptcy. 
Recent years have seen many large U.S. law firms expand 
internationally to reap a variety of benefits.281  Entering the 
global legal market allows firms new opportunities for growth 
that may not be available domestically.282  However, entering 
new markets is expensive, time-consuming, and risky.283  
Initial capital investments needed to establish steady revenue 
flows in overseas offices are high, and the process is slow.284  
 
 281. See, e.g., Going Global: Law Firms Extend their Scope, INTELLIGENT 
INSURER (July 16, 2013), http://www.intelligentinsurer.com/article/going-global-
law-firms-extend-their-scope. 
 282. Robert Sawhney, Strategic Law Firm Expansion in Asia, MKTG. ASIA 
(May 24, 2012, 11:34 AM), http://marketingasia.typepad.com/marketing
_asia/2012/05/strategic-law-firm-expansion-in-asia.html. 
 283. See, e.g., James Tsolakis, A Perspective on the Legal Market, ROYAL BANK 
OF SCOTLAND 17–18 (Apr. 2014), http://www.rbs.com/content/dam/rbs/
Documents/News/2014/03/perspective-on-the-legal-market.pdf. 
 284. See, e.g., Bruce E. Aronson, Elite Law Firm Mergers and Reputational 
Competition: Is Bigger Really Better? An International Comparison, 40 VAND. J. 
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The alternative, an international merger, can be fraught with 
risk or unharmonious firm culture.285  It can take many years 
after the merger to align a firm’s global priorities, tie up loose 
legal ends, and engender an environment of collaboration.286  
Indeed, multi-national companies that retain global law firms 
complain of inconsistent billing and poor communication.287  
Nonetheless, many firms still pursue this type of expansion.  
In doing so, firms use leverage to finance the high cost of global 
growth. 
As in the case of Coudert, rapidly expanding firms can 
struggle to obtain the necessary capital infusion for 
international expansion.  This problem often encourages the 
leveraging of future revenues, which exposes already 
vulnerable firms to enhanced financial liability.  During times 
of economic instability, it becomes difficult to maintain 
profitability: clients scrutinize large attorney fees, and 
indirectly cause anticipated future revenue to shrink. 
Moreover, international revenue streams often take time to 
realize and cannot be relied upon for immediate income.  Law 
firms are especially susceptible to these types of economic 
downturns when clients see legal fees as something to be 
negotiated or cut, an increasingly common reality in the 
modern legal market.  Thus, in attempts to expand 
internationally through law firm mergers, it is rare to see both 
substantial and immediate financial rewards.288  During this 
transition period, law firms remain vulnerable. Leverage 
reduces mobility, and a firm cannot quickly reposition itself in 
response to changed market conditions. 
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Furthermore, law firms necessarily take on increased risk 
when operating in numerous economic environments.  
Diversification across borders often results (at least in the 
medium term) in smaller profits margins and thinner margins 
of error. Operating in the global legal market carries 
unavoidable hazards.  Firms need to be vigilant of changing 
market conditions, while simultaneously being wary of 
incurring too much debt. Simply put, expanding into more 
markets introduces more and more variables into the equation.  
Without taking conscious and deliberate effective measures to 
mitigate the risks inherent in entering into variant economic 
environments, a law firm seeking international expansion can 
easily over-extend its resources. 
In theory expansion into different legal markets should 
provide diversification of risks for a law firm, with the effects 
of an economic slump in one market being offset by the effects 
of a growing economy in another.  However, in the modern 
world, most countries’ economies are interconnected—
although countries may have very different legal regimes, they 
hardly act as discrete “baskets” for risk hedging purposes.  
Global economic downturns are no respecters of international 
borders.  Diversification tends to multiply rather than reduce 
risk. 
Although expansion into foreign markets increases a law 
firm’s prestige, it provides little—if anything—in the way of 
benefits that would help a law firm stave off a bankruptcy in 
the near term.  Instead of preventing bankruptcy, 
international expansion may often precipitate it due to 
shortages of the capital infusion needed to fund growth.  Law 
firms must then seek alternative means such as debt 
financing, which is far riskier for a firm’s financial health.  
Expansion internationally may make sense for other 
commercial reasons, but reducing the risk of bankruptcy is 
decidedly not one of them. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has identified the main causes of law firm 
bankruptcies through a discussion of historical examples of 
such collapses.  After identifying these root causes, this Article 
discussed a number of solutions designed to directly address 
the structural weaknesses leading to law firm financial failure.  
This Article proposes the following recommendations as 
specific solutions that can help prevent—or at least mitigate 
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the effects of—law firm bankruptcies: (1) a market-focused 
solution allowing the public to invest in law firms; (2) the 
adoption of an internal law firm regulatory system whereby all 
of a firm’s finance, oversight, governance, and risk 
management practices are made transparent to all firm 
partners; (3) contractual covenants disincentivizing the 
departure of rainmaker partners; (4) further statutory 
adoption of the common law unfinished business doctrine; and 
(5) regulatory oversight by a governmental agency in the form 
of a legal oversight board. 
These proposed solutions are primarily market-oriented.  
However, this Article does recommend minimal government 
regulation compelling the disclosure of certain law firm 
financial information.  In sum, this Article endorses the 
combination of minimal government regulation disclosure 
requirements with the use of market-based forces to correct the 
business practices that have led large and prestigious law 
firms to declare bankruptcy to the surprise and 
embarrassment of the entire legal profession.  This Article’s 
recommended solutions therefore aim to simultaneously 
correct this market failure and restore confidence in the legal 
profession’s ability to financially manage its institutions. 
 
